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1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of resilience is gaining in popularity (Bhamra et al. 2011), particularly given the increasing num-
ber of situations in which people have to take decisions and act in conditions where there is a high level of un-
certainty, danger and public pressure (Guarnieri et al. 2015). Numerous changes mean that societies are be-
coming more complex and interconnected, while in the safety sciences, resilience studies have emerged that 
increase our understanding of how individuals, groups and organisations respond and recover from excep-
tional, extreme and chaotic situations. Nevertheless, there is both a lack of consensus on the definition of re-
silience, and a lack of empirical studies and practical solutions. 
Resilience is associated with the successful adaptations of a system to an event. Theories and models ad-
dress, among other mechanisms, prevention, response and recovery phases. Resilience activation focuses on 
the early stages of the response phase in order to understand adaptive capacities (Dalziell and McManus 2004) 
and any contingent factors that positively or negatively influence their efficiency. This phase includes the ini-
tial shock (when people have to face the event), the process of overcoming this shock, and any initial actions 
that bring the situation under control – or not (understanding the situation, the decision to act, deciding what 
behaviour to adopt, mobilisation of resources, etc.). 
The article is structured into two parts. The first presents the theoretical context of the study, and in particu-
lar the notion of resilience and its use in the field of the safety management. Secondly, the notion of resilience 
activation is discussed through the study of various models of resilience. In this section, the concept of resili-
ence activation is applied to a case study of the events at the Fukushima Dai Ichi power plant. 
2 RESILIENCE ACTIVATION IN EXTREME SITUATIONS 
Extreme means “beyond the normal range of human experience” (Boyden and Mann 2005). The extreme situ-
ation threatens the status quo as it is consistent with unusual, invisible and even inconceivable events. The ex-
pression extreme situation has at least three characteristics: confronting the unthinkable or the unpresentable; 
a change or upheaval in values or standards that served as reference points or limits, leading to a serious and 
more-or-less sudden attack on the person’s somatic, mental and/ or symbolic integrity that affects the relation-
ship to oneself, others and/ or the environment; and the implementation of diverse resilience strategies that 
can appear paradoxical, and which are aimed not just at survival, but particularly mental survival.  
In an extreme situation, the surprise caused by rapidly-changing conditions or circumstances leads to stupor 
and shock caused by the incoherence between the subject who must take action and their environment (Guar-
nieri et al. 2015). The extreme situation distorts standards and social values and leads to the loss of the usual 
points of reference. Individuals feel powerless, anxious and fearful in the face of an unprecedented, violent 
Resilience activation in extreme situations: a literature review 
C. GEOFFROY, E. RIGAUD, F. GUARNIERI 
MINES ParisTech, PSL Research University, CRC,  
Centre de recherche sur les Risques et les Crises,  
CS 10207 rue Claude Daunesse 06904 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  This paper makes a scientific contribution to the theme of human and organisational factors in 
extreme situations in the context of the nuclear industry. The concept of resilience activation in an extreme 
situation is defined and illustrated, and the initial temporal phase is discussed. The Fukushima Dai Ichi nucle-
ar power plant accident is used as a case study to support the definition and illustrate the concept.  
 
event that may be life-threatening (Travadel and Guarnieri 2015). Such situations shatter existing value sys-
tems and a new system must emerge. Subjects in an extreme situation are torn between the public pressure to 
act, and the physical impossibility of taking action within the established framework. The Fukushima Dai Ichi 
accident demonstrates how difficult it can be for an organisation to activate resilience; in other words, to man-
age the consequences of an accident in order to increase the likelihood that the situation will be brought fully 
under control (Guarnieri and Travadel 2014). 
The following section characterises the challenges linked to resilience for a system in an extreme situation.  
2.1 The concept of resilience  
The concept of resilience refers to the capacity of an individual, a community of individuals, an organisation, 
a region, or a sociotechnical system to react to a shock, in order to maintain or restore the essential functions 
of the system and adapt itself to environmental transformations.    
The following definitions are drawn from Guarnieri et al. (2016). Etymologically the term ‘resilience’ 
comes from the Latin, re and salire (rise). It indicates a retroactive effect (Plodinec 2013). In ecology, in the 
1970s, the term referred to the capacity to absorb and overcome the effects of a large-scale, unforeseen and 
brutal ecological disturbance (Holling 1973). Since then, definitions have become more hybrid and multidis-
ciplinary, and the concept is found in geography (Adger 2000), psychology (Richardson 2002), including pop-
ular psychology (Cyrulnik and Seron 2003) sociology (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003), organisational sci-
ences (Baardwijk and Reinmoeller 2005) or ergo-psychology (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006). It can 
be defined as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances and reorganise itself during continuous change 
(Walker et al. 2004).  
To illustrate the diversity of uses of the notion of resilience, the following table (Table 1) presents a set of 
definitions found in various scientific contexts. These references were selected as they are frequently quoted 
in studies of resilience, in syntheses of existing definitions, or because of the status of the body that provided 
it (e.g. the United Nations).  
 
Table 1.  Selected definitions of resilience 
  
 
A bibliographical approach led to the identification of several models designed to describe the various 
states and phases of a system that faces a crisis situation. A set of keywords related to resilience provided the 
starting point for a Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar search, which resulted in seven models that 
structured our study. 
 
Definition 
The persistence of relationships within a system; a measure of the ability of systems to absorb changes of 
state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist (Holling 1973) 
The capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back 
(Wildavsky 1991) 
The capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new systems and operating conditions (Comfort 
1999) 
The ability to withstand an extreme event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished produc-
tivity, or quality of life without a large amount of assistance from outside the community (Mileti 1999) 
The capability to bounce back and to use physical and economic resources effectively to aid recovery fol-
lowing exposure to hazards (Paton et al. 2001) 
The ability to recognize and adapt to handle unanticipated perturbations that call into question the model 
of competence, and demand a shift of processes, strategies and coordination (Woods 2006) 
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and re-
cover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions (UNISDR 2009) 
The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturb-
ances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected situations (Hollnagel 
et al. 2010) 
2.2 A survey of resilience models 
The survey of resilience models aimed to characterise the phase of resilience activation. The seven models 
were identified by a review of scientific journals and books on the topics of crisis, disaster and resilience 
management. The seven models are shown in Table 2, and they describe processes independently of the sys-
tem they are related to (the individual, organisation, region, etc.).  
 
Table 2.  Selected models of resilience  
 
Models 
General Adaptation Syndrome (Selye 1955 ) 
Panarchy (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
Stress Resistance and Resilience Over Time (Norris et al. 2008) 
Disaster Resilience of Place (Cutter et al. 2008) 
Resilience Activation (Powley 2009) 
Resilience Analysis Grid (Hollnagel et al. 2010) 
3D model (Béné et al. 2012) 
  
The General Adaptation Syndrome (Selye 1955) aims to formalize the various biological phases that struc-
ture the behaviour of individuals facing a stressful event. Four phases are distinguished: 1) alarm, which oc-
curs at the time of the event; 2) resistance, which occurs if the stressful event goes on for more than 48 hours; 
3) return to calm; and 4) exhaustion, which results from chronic stress that compromises the immune system, 
and leads to hormonal changes and psychosomatic diseases. 
The dynamics of socio-ecological systems, or Panarchy model (Gunderson and Holling 2002) considers 
transitions and transformations in states and the thresholds for transitions in systems. Each state corresponds 
to a balance between social and ecological subsystems. The transition from one state to another occurs when a 
set of key stability thresholds are exceeded. The change of state is generally irreversible and engenders a trans-
formation in the structure and dynamics of the system. These changes can have unexpected and unwanted 
consequences. The adaptive dynamics of a socio-ecological system are seen in terms of a four-phase cycle: 1) 
growth; 2) preservation; 3) liberation; and 4) reorganisation.  
The Resistance to Stress and Resilience Over Time model (Norris et al. 2008) considers four interconnect-
ed elements: 1) crisis situations caused by an interaction between a stressor, or adversity that threatens the 
well-being or functioning of a system on the one hand and, on the other hand, the resources and capacities of a 
system; 2) resistance corresponds to situations where resources and capacities can negate the stressor before 
dysfunction occurs; 3) dysfunction corresponds to situations where the stressor exceeds the resources of the 
system; and  4) resilience leads to a return to functioning in the environment through the mobilisation of re-
sources. 
The DROP model (Disaster Resilience of Place) (Cutter et al. 2008) considers the process of resilience in 
terms of a model composed of five interconnected components: 1) the initial (social) system, a constructed 
environment and a natural system that are described using the concepts of inherent vulnerability and resili-
ence; 2) a dangerous event characterised by its frequency, duration, intensity, scale and speed of appearance; 
3) the immediate impact of the event on the system, which is limited or amplified by the presence or absence 
of prevention and response mechanisms; 4) whether the capacity to absorb the consequences of the event may 
be exceeded, depending on the nature of the event or the efficiency of system response mechanisms; and 5) 
the extent of recovery, the knowledge gained and the extent of positive or negative change in the initial sys-
tem. 
The Resilience Activation model (Powley 2009) considers that three key moments are necessary for an or-
ganisation to overcome a trauma: 1) liminal suspension aims to restore the psychological, emotional and rela-
tional balance of all of the actors in the system; 2) compassionate witnessing aims to restore social order; and 
3) relational redundancy aims to  restore the balance between the organisation and its environment. 
The Resilience Analysis Grid (Hollnagel et al. 2010) considers four key capacities: 1) the capacity to face a 
diversity of potential undesirable situations; 2) the capacity to oversee the functioning of the system and its 
evolution; 3) the capacity to anticipate the positive and negative consequences of changes and the evolution of 
the system; and 4) the capacity to learn positive and negative lessons from past situations. 
The 3D model (Béné et al. 2012) considers resilience to a shock as an emergent property resulting from 
three capacities: absorption, adaptation and transformation. If the shock is small, the system will be able to re-
sist and absorb its impact without any consequences. If the absorption capacity is exceeded, adaptation capaci-
ty is mobilised and adjustments are made that allow the system to continue to work without any qualitative 
changes to its functions or structural identity. If the shock exceeds the system’s adaptation capacity, changes 
become transformation, with consequences for the primary structure of the system and its main functions. 
2.3 Resilience activation 
A disaster can be described as the passage from a routine situation to an unusual situation that the system is 
designed for, or an exceptional situation that the system is not designed for. The exceptional situation ends 
when a new routine emerges (Stallings 2006). Resilience activation studies the phenomena that occur imme-
diately following the transition from the routine situation to the exceptional situation, which structure the re-
sponse and recovery phases of the system.  
The Powley model was selected as the framework for the analysis as it takes into account the dynamic di-
mension of resilience; it makes it possible to study how strength emerges after a trauma and helps to under-
stand the mobilisation of resources (Guarnieri et al. 2016).  
Resilience activation (Powley 2009) and organisational healing (Powley 2013; Powley and Cameron 2008; 
Powley and Powley 2012) models help to identify the initial stages of the general process of resilience and de-
fine the key steps that help an organisation to overcome a trauma. The concept of the critical period is used to 
describe the moment when the system, disrupted by a shock, first introduces a set of actions designed to re-
store stability. These interdependent phases and mechanisms structure resilience activation and organisational 
healing. In this paper, we link these phases and mechanisms in order to simplify the description of the model. 
Protective inflammation marks the phase where relational structures are altered, and new relational patterns 
emerge. The suspension of relational structures encourages new and different interactions among the organisa-
tion’s members and offer opportunities to support others and connect in ways that go beyond functional and 
organisational boundaries. The organisation’s members have time to readjust psychologically, emotionally 
and relationally. The unwanted event leads to the suspension of routine activities and resources are allocated 
to overcoming the consequences of the event and preventing the escalation of the situation; 
Compassionate witnessing involves acknowledging and feeling empathy for others. A temporary equality 
emerges between the organisation’s members, which structures a space where they are on an equal footing. 
They are able to show compassion and act in ways that foster caring and supportive relationships. 
Relational redundancy refers to how interpersonal connections interact and extend beyond the immediate 
social reference groups. Individuals find ways to connect with other people, some of whom are not part of 
their usual circle. This higher level of interaction demonstrates how resilience is activated, specifically 
through the multiple actions taken by the organisation’s members who share critical information, connect with 
others, and expand their network of influence. This layer makes it possible to gradually rebuild an operational 
social network, consisting of the new routines, tasks and processes that are necessary for the functioning of the 
system in the new organisational context; 
Remodelling refers to the period when a new organisational structure is gradually put in place. A process of 
learning strengthens the organisation, which becomes sensitive to new, unexpected events and prepares to pro-
tect itself in order to mitigate the consequences. It is also a phase for celebrating the success of the crisis man-
agement process and strengthening the social relationships that emerged during the crisis. 
These phases are supported by four key mechanisms. First, empathy fosters a sensitive response at the be-
ginning of the process and strengthens relationships. Second, internal or external interventions help in facing 
fear and intimidation, stimulate social processes, and allow growth and reconstruction. Third, collective ef-
forts reflects the strong feeling of identification of actors in the system with the organisation and its mission, 
which helps in the resumption and strengthening of social and organisational processes. Finally, leadership 
helps to structure and maintain cohesion between the various actors in the system. 
This first section characterised the concept of resilience activation and the extreme situation. The next sec-
tion illustrates these concepts and outlines avenues for future research.  
3 APPLICATION TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT  
This section presents the results of an initial analysis of the testimony of Masao Yoshida, the Director of the 
Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear power plant (Guarnieri et al. 2015). It begins with a summary of the facts, then 
goes on to present the key avenues of research based on resilience activation studies. Finally, an initial appli-
cation is described. 
3.1 The analytical framework  
The resilience activation model is structured into three phases. The first relates to the restoration of the phys-
iological and psychological balance of the actors in the system. The second concerns the restoration of the so-
cial order within the system. Finally, the third outlines the restoration of the balance between the organisation 
and its environment. For each of these three phases, an analysis framework, derived from the various models 
presented by Powley is applied. 
The schema showed below summarises the framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The analytical framework for resilience activation. 
 
3.1.1 Phase 1: The restoration of the psychological, emotional and relational balance of actors in the system 
 
The first phase is characterised by four criteria:  
 Collapse of points of reference, relations and routine activities following an event;  
 Recovery is a temporary period dedicated to physiological, emotional and relational healing;  
 Diagnosis of the needs of individuals. This criterion concerns an assessment of the psychological, physio-
logical and emotional state of agents; 
 Emergence of a social order reflecting the resilience of individuals. This criterion concerns the organised 
or spontaneous implementation of interactions to support the recovery of agents. 
 
3.1.2. Phase 2: Restoration of a social order 
 
The second phase is characterised by three criteria: 
 Exchange is dedicated to the sharing of experiences. This criterion concerns interactions between agents 
and the sharing of experiences relative to the shock; 
 Caution and adaptation: interactions between individuals are cautious and adapted to the emotional, 
physical and social needs of interlocutors; 
 Creation: the system fosters the creation of solid links between individuals. 
 
3.1.3. Phase 3: Restoration of the balance between the organisation and its environment 
 
The third phase is characterised by four criteria: 
 Increase: the social order increases due to the increase of connections and information exchange between 
actors; 
 Redundancy: the social order tolerates redundancy and excessive information exchange; 
 Strengthening: the social order matures and creates new routines, tasks and process. The system fosters 
recovery by promoting the adaptation of routines to the new environment. The social order restarts essen-
tial system functions. Learning processes foster the dissemination of acquired experience. The system 
strengthens itself in order to prevent a new occurrence of the disruptive event. It becomes better prepared 
and able to protect itself against any consequences. Behaviour supports a return to normal, and the new so-
cial order is valued; 
 Celebrations are organised to remember the event and maintain cohesion between individuals. 
3.2 The Fukushima Daiichi accident 
In March 2011, a major earthquake and a 15-metre tsunami led to the failure of the power supply and  cooling 
systems of three of the six Fukushima Dai Ichi reactors, causing a major nuclear accident.  
The accident extended over for five days. During that time, explosions occurred at reactors 1, 2 and 3, and 
there was a fire at reactor 4 caused by a build-up of hydrogen that resulted in an explosion. The surrounding 
environment was both devastated and dangerous and roads were impassable. High levels of radiation meant 
that workers at the plant were completely isolated from emergency services (such as firefighters).      
3.3 Application of the analysis framework 
This sections presents the testimony of Masao Yoshida at official hearings that were held on 22 and 29 July 
2011 (Guarnieri et al. 2015). First, the transcription of his testimony is presented, followed by an analysis of 
specific elements. The following sections present the initial results. 
3.3.1 Phase 1 (restoration of individual balance) 
The events at the nuclear power plant led to the total collapse of points of reference, relations and routine ac-
tivities. Masao Yoshida’s testimony highlights the impact of the consequences of the event both physically 
and mentally, and underlines the psychological shock leading to the loss of points of reference.   
With respect to the first criterion, collapse, the following extract is relevant: 
“The shocks became more and more violent. I couldn’t stand up any more. Things on shelves fell off, 
screens went blank (…) All of the false ceilings fell down, documents on shelves were spread all over the 
floor” (Guarnieri et al. 2015, p. 82)  
“At the same time, we learned that the diesel generators didn’t work anymore; we said to ourselves that 
wasn’t possible and finally, we said to ourselves that there might have been a tsunami, and this is how, little 
by little, everybody came to an agreement, arrived at the same conclusion. Right at that moment, we were 
completely bewildered” (ibid., p. 104).  
“Then, to be completely frank, I was devastated. At least personally, I mean. I said to myself that we were 
facing a terrible situation. But it was no use complaining. Obviously, we were heading towards a major acci-
dent and we had to prepare. Here we are; that’s what I said to myself. If I had to say what I felt, I would say 
that my first thought was that something terrible had happened” (ibid., p. 106).  
“In these conditions, there were things that we couldn’t explain. Things that we couldn’t even imagine in 
our wildest dreams. When we saw indicators, the figures were completely unbelievable. This was what hap-
pened to us” (ibid., p. 129). The accident threatened the lives of his team: “I thought that we were going to 
die” (ibid., p. 216), or “I believed that was the moment when I really hit bottom. I saw us all dead. (…) I had 
the impression that I wasn’t alive any more. I had died” (ibid., p. 266).  
“We couldn’t see anything” (ibid., p. 97). They could take no action because no information could be 
passed to the crisis unit: “I heard that we had lost all sources of mains power, that the diesel generators 
didn’t work anymore and we were surprised, we couldn’t believe it. At that time, where we were, there were 
no cameras monitoring the sea level. We were in a situation where the security camera data couldn’t reach 
us. And so we knew nothing about what had happened outside” (ibid., p. 104). “We were all so depressed that 
we were speechless” (ibid., p.120). “If you can imagine the atmosphere in the room at the time, it was confu-
sion. All sorts of talk about whether some of us were going to survive and others wouldn’t” (ibid., p. 93). 
With respect to the second criterion, recovery, Yoshida’s testimony does not highlight a time that is specif-
ically dedicated to the psychological care of actors. Nevertheless there appears to be consideration for the state 
of actors and the actions to be undertaken to manage the situation. Yoshida assumes a leadership role: 
“Everybody was upset by the earthquake, I clearly remember telling them to regain their composure. I told 
them that they had to regain their composure, not panic, and that they had to proceed with checks” (ibid., p. 
93) 
“I asked several times if the RCIC1 was working. On the ground, they couldn’t see any indicators. Despite 
that, I asked them to verify them. Then, I only found out later, they had to make enormous sacrifices to do 
what I wanted. Because to verify the functioning of the RCIC, they had to enter the reactor building. I wasn’t 
careful enough. I knew the check would be difficult” (ibid., p. 200). 
 The study of the first two hearings does not clearly reveal the existence of the third criterion (diagnosis). 
With respect to the fourth criterion, emergence, on 14 March at 11:01 am, when reactor building 1 had al-
ready exploded, reactor building 3 exploded. From this moment, the main aim was to regain control over the 
situation and avoid any escalation. The psychological well-being of agents was not a priority although the Di-
rector does show empathy and gratitude to his agents:   
                                                 
1
 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 
“We learned that four people had been hurt, one rather seriously. I heard the news and I knew that nobody 
had been killed and that all of the services had since been resumed, within the group, which reassured me” 
(ibid., p. 255). “If it was true and if actually there had been forty deaths, I had decided to commit hara-kiri” 
(ibid., p. 254). 
3.3.2  Phase 2 (restoration of social order) 
For the criterion exchange the testimony highlights a close interaction between the Director and his agents. 
He does not allow any criticism of them, which testifies to a strong sense of community: “I would attack any-
one who would say such a thing. Really. Please avenge us, on our behalf. We really need it” (Guarnieri et al. 
2015, p. 265). This sense of community is seen in how Yoshida perceives his membership of the group in the 
power plant as different from his membership of other groups: “It was where there was a real gap between 
those who were actually on the ground, those who were close to the ground, as in the crisis unit, and those 
who were really far from the ground, for example headquarters” (ibid., p. 138). 
With respect to the second criterion, caution and adaptation, this is seen in the fact that Yoshida feels 
empathy for the teams on the ground: “the staff who were on the ground suffered even more than me” (ibid., 
p.162). Even if he understands the sacrifices his team made, he must maintain the role of leader and manage 
the accident. He succeeds in creating a climate of harmony and unity: “I asked them, humbly. That is when I 
experienced one most great emotions of my life. They wanted all to return to the field, they even pushed each 
other out of the way. I had to control them. The rush would have been dangerous and counterproductive” 
(ibid., p. 259). 
With respect to the third criterion, creation, the testimony illustrates strong group cohesion and trust dur-
ing decision-making: collective effort is seen in the strong feeling of identification of individuals with the or-
ganisation and its missions. This mechanism is seen in the willingness of the team to return to the field, 
despite the risk of radiological condition after the explosion of reactor 3, “It was there that most of the men 
were exposed to radiation at the limit of acceptable values” (ibid., p. 259). 
3.3.3 Phase 3 (restoration of balance with the environment) 
With respect to the criterion increase, the testimony illustrates the spontaneous willingness of workers to car-
ry out activities within the power plant. Yoshida talks about a woman, a member of the prevention group, who 
did not want to leave after the accident and stayed on in the field to help firefighters: “She worked for a long 
time in the prevention group, she was a person who had a very strong sense of duty and we couldn’t make her 
leave, I mean she didn’t want to leave” (Guarnieri et al. 2015, p. 269). “She ensured that there was gasoline 
for the fire brigade, she met them, took care of them and the Tokyo fire brigade units that came to help later. 
She was extremely effective in her work. We talked about her in the newspaper. She was a woman who ex-
ceeded the threshold of internal contamination. It is not just about irradiation. She was devoted person, she 
felt that she had a mission, that’s why she worked like that” (ibid., p. 268). 
With respect to redundancy the testimony does  not describe a return to normality by adapting the norma-
tive framework to a new environment. The identification of solutions did not create a normative framework to 
resolve problems within a hostile environment: 
“By chance, other trucks arrived from outside and, as we had three trucks, we managed to increase the re-
lease pressure. All of this was done on the spot, improvised” (ibid., p. 153).  
“Personally, the only thing I know is that in the end, nobody did anything for us” (ibid., p. 240). With re-
gard to strengthening the internal resources, they were dysfunctional: “fire hydrants could not supply water, 
because the  fire extinguishing system, which was buried, had melted” (ibid., p. 239)  
In other cases, resources were missing and it was necessary to adapt other solutions: “We looked for car 
batteries, to put them into the control rooms and use them as source of energy” (ibid., p. 115). 
The study of the first two hearings provides no material related to the criterion of celebration.  
The application of the analysis framework to the testimony of Fukushima Daiichi’s Director illustrates the 
set of criteria. These preliminary results are an initial introduction to an in-depth study of the testimony, which 
will identify lessons and enrich the resilience activation model.  
4 CONCLUSION 
 
This article presents the application of an analysis framework for resilience activation. It makes it possible to 
identify some initial lessons resulting from extreme events.  
First, it presents the state-of-the-art regarding models of organisational dynamics in crisis situations, and 
discusses the concept of resilience activation. Secondly, an analytic framework is developed from the model 
and it is applied to the testimony of the Director of the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear power plant. This analysis 
may help us to understand how resilience is activated in an extreme situation. Our research aims to show how 
individuals can take decisions and act following this kind of event. Masao Yoshida’s testimony teaches us 
that, despite the beyond-design situation, workers were able to manage the nuclear reactors throughout the 
critical period.  
Three perspectives will structure future research. The first concerns the consolidation of the resilience acti-
vation model by taking into account models of the dynamics of resilient systems, and other models that have 
been developed in the context of human and social sciences of the structure, dynamics and resilience of indi-
viduals, groups and organisations. Secondly, the analysis of testimony must be extended to identify any les-
sons that may serve as a support for learning from experience. Finally, we will investigate resilience activation 
in more detail. This will involve the detailed study of the interaction between the system and the disruptive 
event, and how and why the initial actions that are designed to manage the situation are triggered.  
 
This research is financially supported by the French Ministry of Defence, Directorate General of Arma-
ments.   
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